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CASE NOTES
AGENCY-VICARIOUS LIABILITY-ABROGATION OF
THE BOTH WAYS RULE
The plaintiff, who was riding with his servant at the time of an auto-
mobile accident, brought an action against the defendant corporation
alleging negligence on the part of the driver of its vehicle. Defendant
alleged the contributory negligence of the plaintiff's servant, which when
imputed to the plaintiff, would bar recovery.' The trial court found for
the defendant, holding that the negligence of the servant was imputed
to his master so as to bar the master's right of recovery against the negli-
gent third party. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed and thereby
abandoned the rule that the negligence of a servant is imputed to his mas-
ter, so as to bar the master's right of recovery against a negligent third
party when the master is vicariously liable to the third party. Weber v.
Stokley-Van Camp, Inc., - Minn. -, 144 N.W.2d 540 (1966).
The instant case is significant because it is the first and, as of this writ-
ing, the only case to have attacked the heretofore universally accepted doc-
trine of imputed contributory negligence in an action where the master
was plaintiff, rather than defendant.2 In abandoning this doctrine, the court
refused to apply ancient precedents, which had neither offered nor were
themselves supported by any rational basis for such imputation. Rather,
it predicated its decision upon critical analysis, instead of upon unques-
tioning reliance on historical dogma. In order to fully understand the
court's decision, and thereby evaluate its wisdom, this note will discuss
the history of and the modern justification for the common law doctrine
of respondeat superior. It will then be possible to examine the effects of
the case on the substantive law, as well as its wider application to juristic
philosophy and methodology.
The doctrine of respondeat superior has been a viable juristic concept
for several centuries. The question of whether the precise etiology of the
rule of vicarious liability has its roots in the antiquarianism of the Roman
Law of pater familias' or whether it is the precipitate of some almost
1 As to the manner and necessity of pleading imputed contributory negligence as a
defense where still recognized as such, see Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 273 (1958). As to the
necessity of pleading' that the tort was actually committed by the servant in an action
brought by a third party against the master, see Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 292 (1949).
2The court limited its holding to automobile negligence cases. - Minn. -, 144
N.W.2d 540, 565 (1966).
3 Mr. Justice Holmes, in tracing the history of vicarious liability and tile "identifica-
tion fiction," concluded that their sources lay in the Roman Law of pater familias
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imperceptible moral and/or social syncretism wrought by the emergence
and growth of corporate enterprise and theory is not the burning polemic
today it was a few years ago.4
Yet, this is not to say that the concept itself is no longer sufficiently
novel or important to be worthy of careful investigation and possible
amelioration or clarification. Indeed, in no branch of legal thought are
the principles in such sad confusion.5 Perhaps nowhere has it been so
difficult to win assent to What some have deemed fundamental dogma,6
and perhaps nowhere is the law more replete with "theories" which, upon
close scrutiny, reveal themselves as dangerous generalizations which shiver
into untruth upon the approach of fact.7
Because the courts have laid inordinate insistence upon the origins of
the law rather than upon the ends it is to serve, there have been no satis-
factory explanations of the results reached in cases arising out of the
master-servant relationship. Instead, the courts have taken refuge in syl-
logisms and historical antecedents all of which have been, at best, im-
potent aids in the analytical process. 8
A careful examination is required for an understanding of the modern
justification for the doctrine of respondeat superior, which today is gen-
erally acknowledged to be based on policy considerations. These con-
siderations are to the effect that if the employer is compelled to bear the
burden of his servant's torts, even when he is himself without fault, it
is because, in a social distribution of profit and loss, the balance of least
disturbance seems thereby best to be obtained.9
and the system of frankpledge, or Frithborh, familiar in England at the time of the
Conquest. See Holmes, The History of Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1891) and 5
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1891), reprinted in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL His-
TORY 368 (1909).
4 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 530 (1895); Wigmore, Re-
sponsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315, 442 (1894).
5 Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.j. 105 (1916).
6 See BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY (1916); See also MEciIEM, AGENCY § 499 (3rd ed.
1923).
7 Parke, Alderson, and Cranworth ascribe the basis of liability to "qui facit per aliul
facit per se." See Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 509 (1840); Hutchinson v. York,
Newcastle Ry., 5 Ex. 343 (1850); Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid, 3 Macq. 266; (1858).
Pothier ascribed its force to the necessity of making men careful in their selection of
servants. See POTHIER, OBLIGATIONS 72 (Evans transl. 1826). For a synopsis of the
divergent theories and a scholarly treatment of the entire subject see Laski, supra note
5; See also PROSSER, TORTS § 68 (3rd ed. 1964).
8 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 68.
9 Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584 (1929);
MECHIEM, AGENCY § 351 (4th ed. 1952); Seavey, Speculations As To Respondeat Supe-
rior, HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433 (1934).
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It has been suggested by a weighty authority that the social interpreta-
tion of respondeat superior and the companion rule of imputed contribu-
tory negligence will yield the only satisfactory clue to the often bewilder-
ing labyrinth presented by the a priori methodology employed by the
courts in rendering judgments in this area. 10 Indeed, as will be seen, it
is upon this very premise that the rationale of the instant case is predicated.
Imputed contributory negligence is but the obverse of the doctrine of
respondeat superior. Imputable contributory negligence, which will bar
the plaintiff from recovery, exists when the plaintiff, although not charge-
able with personal negligence, has been, by the negligence of a person in
privity with him and with whose fault he is chargeable, exposed to the
injury which he received through the negligence of the defendant. In
cases of its character, if the negligence of the person exposing the plain-
tiff to injury is the proximate cause of the injury, the plaintiff cannot re-
cover because the contributory negligence of such person will be imputed
to him."
Essentially, imputation of the negligence of a servant to a master rests
on the so called "both ways" rule, that is, if the master is vicariously liable
to a third party due to the servant's negligence, he is also barred from
recovery because his servant's negligence is imputed to him. 12
Prior to the decision in the Weber case, there had been a monolithic
acceptance of the "both ways" rule, whose duality of operation had been
assumed, sub silentio, to be an a priori necessity.1 Yet, an examination of
the cases fails to disclose just what, if anything, necessitated or justified
the operation of the rule in cases where the master was the plaintiff rather
than the defendant.1 4
The attitude of the courts toward this situation and their resolution
of the problems presented by it are exemplified by the case of City of
Newark v. United States.'5 In that action the plaintiff sought to recover
for damage to its ambulance caused by a collision with the defendant's
10 Laski, supra note 5, at 121.
11 See generally BEACH, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 32-33 (1885); 3 COOLEY, TORTS
492 (4th ed. 1932); SmITH, LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 344 (4th ed. 1886).
12Supra note 2, at -, 144 N.W.2d at 541. See also Gregory, Vicarious Respon-
sibility and Contributory Negligence, 41 YALE L.J. 831 (1932).
'a Knapp v. Styer, 280 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1960); Pass v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
242 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1957); Louisville N.A. & C. Rv. v. Stommel, 126 Ind. 35, 25 N.E.
863 (1890); La Riviere v. Pemberton, 46 Minn. 5, 48 NAY. 406 (1891); Page v. Hodge,
63 N.H. 610, 4 Atl. 805 (1885).
14 Van Lien v. Scoville Mfg. Co., 14 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 74 (N.Y. 1873); Smith v. New
York Cent. & H. Ry., 38 N.Y.S. 666 (1896); 4 AM. & ENG. ENCY. LAW 82 (1888); 29
CYc. LAW & PROC. 545 (1908).
15 149 F.Supp. 917 (1957), aff'd 254 F.2d 93 (1958).
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mail truck. The defendant counterclaimed for damage to its vehicle, al-
leging the negligence of plaintiff's servant. The trial court held that the
drivers of both vehicles were negligent and that such negligence was im-
putable to their respective employers, precluding recovery by either. In
dismissing the defendant's counterclaim the court said that "the negli-
gence of the mail truck driver, imputable without question to his employer,
the United States, clearly establishes that judgment on the Government's
counterclaim must be entered for the City."'1 6 The court apparently felt
that the issue was so indisputable that it failed to support the above state-
ment with either authorities or its own rationale.
The instant case then is salient not merely because it is the first, and
as yet, the only case in the United States to have changed the dichotomous
operation of the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence, but also be-
cause it is perhaps the only modern case dealing with the problem which
has employed an analytical rationale rather than a scholastic dialectic, or
no dialectic at all, in reaching its decision.
While the court has taken an unprecedented posture, 17 its decision was
not dictated by the conclusion that the "both ways" rule was not a
logical imperative. Rather, the court spent its energy on the study of the
ends which the doctrine has sought to subserve. Indeed, implicit in the
court's opinion is the notion that more important than either a formal,
logical systematization of rules of law or an historical study of them is
the establishment of their postulates from within, upon accurately meas-
ured social desires instead of traditions. For, as Mr. Justice Holmes once
said, "a body of law is more rational and more civilized when every rule
it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end which it sub-
serves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or are ready
to be stated in words."
18
Using the above methodology, the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned
that the justification for holding a master liable for the negligence of his
servant, viz. the social necessity for creating a solvent defendant, 19 was
"completely lacking" 20 in the instance where the master sues a third party
tortfeasor for damages sustained by him as a result of the concurrent
negligence of the servant and the third party. Thus, it is a non sequitur
16 Id. at 920. (Emphasis added).
17 Aside from the overwhelming body of case law which is antithetical to the instant
case, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 486 (1965), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
AGENCY § 317 (1958).
18 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 468-69 (1897).
19 BATY, op. cit. supra note 6. See also Baty, The Basis Of Responsibility, 32 JuRID.
REv. 1159 (1920).
20 Supra note 2, at -, 144 N.W.2d at 542.
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to say that because the intendment of the doctrine of respondeat superior
is to impose liability against a master, it also is its policy to impute to
him the contributory negligence of his servant thus interdicting him from
recovery. The court concluded that the rule barring recovery in such cases
is "defensible only on the grounds of its antiquity."
21
The court also took cognizance of the strong trend away from the
strict application of the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence. In-
deed, it noted that the entire doctrine, as it applied to relationships other
than master and servant, has been abrogated in almost all jurisdictions,
and where it still exists it is moribund. 2
2
Yet, paradoxically, despite the obvious dissatisfaction with the doctrine,
there has been a judicial reluctance to extend the renunciation into the
master servant relationship. The court in the Weber case has, however,
refused to so restrict its abrogation and has explicitly rejected a particular
facet of the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence in this area
as well.
Chief Justice Knutson, in arriving at, and in support of, this decision
drew an analogy between the Minnesota Financial Responsibility Act
23
and the common law doctrine of imputed contributory negligence. He
examined the doctrine in light of this statute, which makes the owner of
an automobile liable for injuries to third persons caused by the negligence
of any person who is operating the car with the owner's consent. In effect,
a statutory agency is created, which results in vicarious liability.
24
The majority of the courts which have considered the effect of these
statutes imputing the contributory negligence of the driver to the
owner have looked, as did the court in the instant case, to the purpose
and intendment of the statute. They concluded that the legislative intent
was to protect injured plaintiffs against the financial irresponsibility of
drivers and to protect, rather than diminish, any right to recovery which
would otherwise be allowed. Hence, they have held that the legislation
does not have the effect of imputing contributory negligence. 25
21 Supra note 2, at __ , 144 N.W.2d at 545.
22 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS 5 485 (1965); PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 7,
at §72; Annot., 59 A.L.R. 153 (1927); ANNOT., 110 A.L.R. 1099 (1937), Annot., 42
A.L.R.2d 937 (1955). In those jurisdictions subscribing to the doctrine of last clear
chance or comparative negligence, the imputation of a servant's negligence to the
master will not necessarily preclude the latter's recovery against a third party tortfeasor.
See Knapp v. Styer, 280 F.2d 384 (1960); See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS
5486 (1965).
23 MINN. REV. STAT. § 170.54 (1960).
24 Such statutes are in force in about a dozen states. See cases collected in PROSSER,
op. cit. supra note 7, at § 72.
25 Ibid. See also Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 1437 (1950). The question of the application
of the family car doctrine to impute the contributory negligence of the driver to the
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The court, in the instant case, found precious little difference between
the purpose of the common law rule of liability and the corresponding
statutory progeny. Thus, if the latter did not preclude a bailor's action
against azthird party tortfeasor, the court was unable to find any reason
why the former, whose basic purpose was the same as that of the statu-
tory rule imposing liability, should bar a master's action. The court said
that "in view of the fact that imputed negligence has now been abandoned
.. as to relationships where it formerly applied, it is difficult to find any
tenable reason why it should be retained in a master-servant relationship
where the master is entirely without fault. '20 Thus, the instant case ex-
pressly rejected the heretofore unquestioned assumption that the rule
of imputed negligence "must work both ways if it is to work at all."'27
After discussing certain "inconsistent applications of the rule," 20 the
court moved on to what seemed to them the most glaring inconsistency.
The theory of liability in cases presenting the same factual milieu as in
the instant case is predicated upon the master's theoretic right of control.
Yet, the court was of the opinion that by virtue of contemporary condi-
tions any attempt on the part of the master to exercise such control
would be the clearest evidence of active negligence on the part of the master,
for which he would be .chargeable without imputing to him the negligence of
his servant. Imputed negligence on the other hand, presupposes that the master
is innocent of any fault. How, then, can we reconcile the theory of right to
control, the exercise of which would charge the master with negligence and im-
puted negligence based on the theory that he is free from any fault? The two
just don't hang together.29
Hence, the import of the instant case is manifest. It has completely
changed one facet of the substantive law of vicarious liability in Minnesota,
and its rationale may well serve as precedent in other forums. In addition,
the methodology and the very hypostasis of the opinion manifest an
impatience with attempts to settle matters of social policy by dialectic rea-
soning from obdurate concepts by pressing words to a drily logical ex-
treme. To be sure, nothing is more antithetical to a jurisprudence of con-
ceptions. The court is not indifferent to the claims of exact, explicit, and
owner when the latter is suing for damages to his car or person has seldom arisen.
Where it has, however, it has been held that the "both ways" rule applies thereby
precluding the owner's recovery. See Prendergast v. Allen, 44 R.I. 379, 117 Atd. 539
(1922). Contra, Michaelsohn v. Smith, 113 N.W.2d 571 (ND. 1962).
26 Supra note 2, at -, 144 N.W.2d at 544.
27 See Gregory, supra note 12, at 831 where the "both ways" rule received its name.
Prior to this, however, there had been a universal though tacit acceptance of the
philosophy of the rule.
28 Supra note 2, at -, 144 N.W.2d at 543. 29 Id. at -- , 144 N.W.2d at 545.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
consistent reasoning. In reality, it is not logic to which it takes exception.
Rather, it objects to the specious logic which is involved in applying the
classic systems of fictitious, fixed concepts, which were never meant to
wear the aspects of immortality, and demonstrative exact subsumptions
under them, to the decision of problems which emanate from a living
conflict of desires and the seamless web of life. 30 Indeed, as Professor Laski
said:
[W]e can not run a world on the principles of formal logic. The test of our
rule's worth must, in fact, be purely empirical in character. We have to study
the social consequences of its application, and deduce therefrom its logic. We
have to search for the mechanism of our law in life as it actually is, rather than
fit the life we live to a priori rules of a rigid legal system.31
Thus, the court makes it abundantly clear that "neither the doctrine
of respondeat superior nor any other principle governing master and
servant [should be] amplified and extended so as to perpetrate wrong or
work oppression upon the master. The rule should be [upheld] but should
not be allowed to escape its bounds, so as to invade and perchance destroy
the rights of the master.
' 32
Just what effect the instant case will have on future decisions of other
courts remains to be seen. Yet, if it is less than an effulgent apocalypse, it
is certainly more than an apostasy from the principles of respondeat su-
perior. The court in the Weber case has broken from the unquestioning,
assumptive application of the legal fictions embodied in the doctrine itself
and has adopted an analytical methodology, predicted upon contemporary
social conditions, designed to yield a result consistent with the fundamental
30 Mr. Justice Holmes expressed this thought most cogently when he said, "the
whole outline of the law is the resultant of a conflict at every point between logic
and good sense-the one striving to work fiction out to consistent results, the other
restraining and at last overcoming that effort when the result becomes too manifestly
unjust." Holmes, The History of Agency, 4 HARV. L. REv. 345, 346 (1891). See also
Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929), and Gaines v. Jacobson, 308
N.Y. 218, 124 N.E.2d 290 (1954) where the court refused to carry the "relation back"
fiction in annulment cases to its logical conclusion because to have done so would have
resulted in injustice. Thus, it is clear that even had the Minnesota Supreme Court in
the instant case found the dual operation of the "both ways" rule to be a logical
necessity, it would not have been compelled to carry that fiction to its ultimate conclu-
sion if to do so would work an injustice.
31 Laski, supra note 5, at 113.
32 Grubb v. Galveston, H. & S.A.Ry., 153 S.W. 694, 696 (Civ. App. 1913) rehearing
denied 153 S.W.694 (1913). Conversely, it should not be amplified to capriciously
create liabilities in a master. For an interesting illustration of how this might occur if
the "both ways" rule were rigidly adhered to in all cases, see Shell Oil Company's
unsuccessful contention in Drewry v. Dapsit Bros. Marine Divers Inc., 317 F.2d 429
(5th Cir. 1963). See also Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 630 (1906) wherein Mr.
Justice Holmes said, "fiction always is a poor ground for changing substantial rights."
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intendment of respondeat superior, rather than to subserve the ends of
formal logic.
Jeffrey Cole
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DRAFT CARD BURNING-SYMBOLIC
EXPRESSION NOT IN PUBLIC INTEREST
On October 15, 1965, the appellant, David Miller, burned his draft
card while giving a speech at a street rally near the Army Building in
Manhattan. The appellant believed the burning of his Notice of Classifica-
tion to be a symbolic protest against the draft, the military action in Viet-
nam, and the law prohibiting the knowing destruction or mutilation of draft
cards.1 The trial court convicted Miller for knowingly destroying a Se-
lective Services Notice of Classification. The United States Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the public interest pro-
tected by the proper functioning of the Selective Service System, a pur-
pose served by statute making it unlawful to mutilate or destroy a draft
card, outweighs any alleged abridgement of freedom of symbolic expres-
sion of speech by a registrant's burning of his draft card. Miller v. United
States, 367 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, No. 851, U.S., February 13,
1967.
The Miller case is significant because it is the first case to interpret the
1965 amendment of section 12(b) (3) of the Universal Military Service
and Training Act which prohibits the knowing mutilation or destruction
of draft cards. The purpose of this note is to analyze the constitutionality
of the amendment in light of the guarantees of freedom of expression as
embraced by the first amendment. In this analysis, the purpose of the
amendment and the character of the act of destroying a draft card as
symbolic speech will be discussed. It will then be possible to consider
whether Congress may, under the pretense of its power to raise and sup-
port armies suppress a form of dissent hostile toward national policy.
It was contended by the appellant that section 12(b) (3) of the Uni-
versal Military Service and Training Act, as amended in 1965, under which
he was convicted, was unconstitutional. The reasons posited for the alleged
unconstitutionality were: (1) that the statute is unconstitutional on its
face because its legislative history establishes that it was enacted deliberately,
and for the purpose of suppressing dissent; (2) it is unconstitutional as ap-
I Universal Military Training and Service Act, § 12 (b) (3), 62 Stat. 604 (1948), 50
U.S.C. App. § 462(b) (3) (1965). "Any person ... (3) who forges, alters or knowingly
destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such certificate or any
notation duly and validly inscribed thereon . . . (6) [shall], upon conviction, be fined
not to exceed $10,000 or be imprisoned for not more than five years or both."
